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medicine more meritorious, but may account for some otherwise surprising lapses. Forexample
he sees Erasistratos as a stepping stone in a harmonious tradition from Hippocrates to Galen,
not as the founder ofa theory that Galen constantly attacked. This is a view that could hardly be
taken by anyone who had readmuch Galen for himself. Anotherstumblingpoint is thetheory of
vision. He has strange remarks on "eye-spirit" and he omits some ofthe more ingenious ancient
arguments forsight being an active process. In fact the "old medicine" (as William Harvey called
it) is often more plausible than the book makes out. Hoeniger describes what people used to
think very well, but is less successful at explaining why they thought it and why they were content
with their orthodoxies.
One final criticism. Themodern authorities cited on ancient medicine are often out ofdate and
many eminent living scholars are not referred to at all. Consequently some matters are dealt with
inadequately. Furthermore the book's value for reference puposes is reduced. This is a pity.
Nevertheless, Hoeniger's is the most comprehensive and generally useful book that exists on the
subject, and for this he deserves congratulations, not complaints.
Maurice Pope, Oxford
ALBERT R. JONSEN, The new medicine and the old ethics, Cambridge, Mass., and London,
Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. xv, 171, £15.25 (0-674-61725-8).
Jonsen's title is inspired by Sir William Osler's 1919 lecture to the British Classical Association,
'The old humanities and the new science'. Osler championed the new medical sciences in a
curriculum dominated by traditional humanities, Jonsen's 1988 Harvard Medical School Gay
lectures champion the humanities (history and philosophy of medicine, medical ethics) in a
medical curriculum dominated by science. The title also encapsulates Jonsen's central theme:
that new medical technology exacerbates pre-existing tensions in five "old" medical ethics: a
Hippocratic ethic ofbeneficence, a Samaritan ethic ofcharity, a Lockean ethic ofproperty right,
a Percivalean ethic of noblesse oblige, and a Cabotean ethic of competence.
Jonsen calls his approach to history aggadah: "a magical rabbinic mode ofthought in which
myth, theology, poetry, and superstition robustly mingle" (p. 4). A description with deeper
historiographic roots would be "monumentalist". The coinage is Nietzsche's and characterizes
historians, like Jonsen, who believe that "History ... gives moral meaning to the past; [and]
moral confidence in the future.. ." (p. 157). Some might blanche at finding meaning in history;
not Nietzsche-who disdained "scientific" history as a degenerate form of"critical" history and
extolled monumentalism. Jonsen's lectures are a testament to the virtues of monumentalism;
e.g., his use of Locke's labour theory of property to analyse physicians' proprietary claims on
diseases-often asserted by those ignoring the persons whose bodies lodge the diseases (p. 93).
Nietzsche warned that "whenever the monumental vision of the past rules ... the past itself
suffers damage: ... great... portions... are forgotten and despised... and only single
embellished facts stand out as islands...."1 Consider Jonsen's claim that bioethics arose in the
1960s as a consequence of the "Scribner Shunt" which, by making kidney dialysis practical,
generated a demand for hemodialysis that swamped the supply of dialyzers. Unfortunately,
"No ... reflection on ... Hippocratic, Samaritanian, and Cabotean ethics could [resolve the
dilemma, forcing experiments like the] Seattle [Patient Selection] Committee. .. [which] did its
best without formal principles" (p. 46). Physicians confronted with the bankruptcy of their old
ethics turned to "philosophers, theologians and lawyers" in search of"better" solutions-and so
bioethics was born.
This version of the past "forgets" and "embellish[es]" by taking the Seattle Committee as
paradigmatic. Of the 120 U.S. dialysis centres operating in the mid-1960s, only 8 followed
Seattle's example and allowed lay persons to participate in patient selection. The other 192
committees were staffed by health care professionals and selected patients according to
1Friedrich Nietzsche, On the advantage and disadvantage of history for life, transl. Peter Preuss,
Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co., 1980, p. 15.
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traditional medical criteria of triage. Seattle appears to have been the only patient selection
committee to evaluate prospective patientsexplicitly in terms ofa utilitarian standard of"social
worth"; it was the only committee to have become embroiled in public controversy.2 Thus the
moral of the early dialysis crisis would seem to be that health professionals selecting patients
according to an "old" medical principle, triage, were able to allocate scarce resources with few
problems, while committees on which lay members introduced non-medical selection criteria,
like "social worth", became embroiled in controversy. It is only by forgetting about the 192
non-controversial committees, and about lay participation on the Seattle Committee, that
Jonsen can tell his taleofthefailure of"old" medical ethics and theconcomitant search for a new
bioethic.
To vex Jonsen with facts, however, is to commit what philosophers call a "category mistake".
Johnson is not aiming at academic history but aggadah. He isolates,juxtaposes, and embellishes
to illuminate, to reveal, to inspire-and he does so brilliantly.
Robert Baker, Union College, Schenectady
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, Strangers at the bedside: ahistoryofhow law andbioethicstransformed
medical decisionmaking, New York, Basic Books, 1991, pp. xi, 303, $24.95 (0-465-08209-2).
David Rothman, author ofthe Discovery ofthe asylum, has written the first social history of
the bioethical revolution: how it came about that "outsiders, not doctors, defined the moral
codes that were to guide physician behavior" (p. 4). The revolution wasprecipitated,during and
after World War II, by the extensive governmental funding ofhospital-based research, and the
increasing social distance between hospital-based physicians and their patients. The first
conflated the physician-patient with the science-subject relationship, the second tempted some
physician-scientists to advance science (and their careers) by treating patients as subjects
(generating scandals at Sloan-Kettering, the U.S. Public Health Service, Willowbrook and
elsewhere).
Coincidentally, new medical technologies attracted public attention to the problem of excess
demand for heart and, especially, kidney transplants. Traditional medical ethics offered few
answers to the problem ofallocating scarce organs. So, to bufferexternal criticism, the medical
community set up lay allocation committees-and in the process, allowed outsiders into
medicine. A similar buffering process occurred in medical research, where review committees
(known as IRBs) were set up to protect "patients" rights in the aftermath ofscandals. Allowing
select professional ousiders, the bioethicists (lawyers, philosophers, and theologians concerned
with medical ethics), to serve on oversight committees was thus the price the medicalprofession
willingly paid to securepublic and governmentfinancing, whileshielding itspractices from more
pervasive public and particularly political scrutiny.
Rothman's focus is on persons and events. Thus "change", that is the bioethical revolution,
"beganwith awhistle-blowerand a scandal" (p. 15). Thescandal,usingpatients asunconsenting
guinea pigs; the whistle-blower, Harvard anaesthesiologist, Henry Beecher-whose 1966 New
EnglandJournal ofMedicine article described twenty-two cases ofpublished research in which
human subjects were abused. Why did Beecher "blow the whistle"? Rothman emphasizes
Beecher's fear that "bad ethics would undercut the pursuit ofgood science" (p. 72). He barely
mentions the world-wide debate over codes of experimentation engendered by the 1949
Nuremberg trial of Nazi physicians and the subsequent 1954 and 1964 codes of the World
Medical Association-or Beecher's adamant opposition to the 1963 Harvard regulations on
research.
2A. H. Katz, and D. M. Proctor, Social-psychological characteristics ofpatients receiving hemodialysis
treatmentfor chronicrenalfailure, Public Health Service, Kidney Disease Program, Washington D. C.,July
1969; quoted in Renee Fox and Judith Swazey, The courage tofail: a social view oforgan transplants and
dialysis, 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 228 ff.
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